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Abstract
Extensive study on the complexity of computing Nash Equilibrium has resulted in the definition of
the complexity class PPAD by Papadimitriou [15]. Subsequently, it was shown that Nash Equilibrium
computation is PPAD-complete, first by Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou [6] for 4 or more
players, then by the same authors [6] for 3 players, and even for the bimatrix case by Chen and Deng
[2]. On the other hand, it is well known that Nash equilibria of games with smooth payoff functions are
generally Pareto-inefficient [5]. In particular, it means that it is possible that a strategy, possibly mixed,
that is not a Nash equilibrium will admit a higher payoff for both players than a Nash equilibrium. In the
spirit of Von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem and its polynomial-time solvability via Linear Programming,
Kalantari [10] has described a multilinear minimax relaxation (MMR) that provides an approximation
to a convex combination of expected payoffs in any Nash Equilibrium via linear programming. In this
paper, we study this relaxation for the bimatrix game, with payoff matrices normalized to values between
0 and 1, solving its corresponding LP formulation and comparing its solution to the solution computed
by the Lemke-Howson algorithm. We also give a game theoretic interpretation of MMR formulation for
the bimatrix game which involves a meta-player. Our relaxation has the following theoretical advantages:
(1) It can be computed in polynomial time; (2) For at least one player, the computed MMR payoff is at
least as good any Nash Equilibrium payoff; (3) There exists a computable convex scaling of the payoff
matrices so that the corresponding expected payoffs are equal. Such a solution may be a satisfactory
compromise to both players since, aside from equality of payoffs, MMR guarantees one player’s payoff is
always as good as any Nash equilibrium payoff. Computationally, we have compared our approach with
the state-of-the-art implementation of the Lemke-Howson algorithm [12]. In problems up to 150 actions,
apparently the guaranteed computational limit of Lemke-Howson, we observe the following advantages:
(i) MMR outperformed Lemke-Howson in time complexity; (ii) In about 80% of the cases the MMR
payoffs for both players are better than any Nash Equilibria; (iii) in the remaining 20%, while one
player’s payoff is better than any Nash Equilibrium payoff, the other player’s payoff is only within a
relative error of 17%.
Keywords: Von Neumann Minimax Theorem, Nash Equilibrium, Pareto-efficiency, PPAD-complete,
Multilinear Minimax Relaxation, Linear Programming, Lemke-Howson, Matrix Scaling.
1 Introduction
One of the first significant results in Game Theory was established by von Neumann [14] that any bimatrix
zero-sum game has an equilibrium, known as the Minimax Theorem. Formally, the result is a statement on
matrices: given an n×m real matrix A, there exists vectors x∗ ∈ Rn, y∗ ∈ Rm such that
min
y∈Sm
max
x∈Sn
xTAy = (x∗)TAy∗ = max
x∈Sn
min
y∈Sm
xTAy, (1)
where, Sk = {u ∈ Rk :
∑k
i=1 ui = 1, ui ≥ 0}, the unit simplex in dimension k. The game theoretic
interpretation of this formulation is as follows: Simultaneously, the Row player selects an index i ∈ [1, n] and
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the Column player selects an index j ∈ [1,m]. Then Row wins Aij dollars and Column loses Aij dollars.
According to von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem, there exist mixed strategy probability vector x∗ for Row
and probability vector y∗ for Column so that the minimum expected win for Row is equal to the maximum
expected loss for Column. The dimensions of the payoff matrices correspond to the number of actions for
both players.
Nash [13] considered a more general game, where Row and Column each have their own n × m real
matrices R = (Rij) and C = (Cij), called payoff matrices. Once Row selects a mixed strategy, i.e. a
probability vector x ∈ Sn and Column selects a probability vector y ∈ Sm, with the composite vector
p = (x, y), the payoffs for Row and Column are the quantities R[p] = xTRy and C[p] = xTCy, respectively.
Nash’s brilliant insight, as well as its proof, was the existence of a composite vector p∗ = (x∗, y∗) such that
max{R[p] : p = (x, y) ∈ Sn × Sm, y = y∗} = R[p∗] (2)
and
max{C[p] : p ∈ Sn × Sm, x = x∗} = C[p∗]. (3)
Thus neither Row nor Column can improve their payoffs when the other player’s probability vector is
fixed. In this sense there is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. p∗. Nash equilibrium is not necessarily unique. We can
also define the composite vector p∗ = (x∗, y∗) to be the ε-Nash equilibrium if
max{R[p] : p = (x, y) ∈ Sn × Sm, y = y∗} ≤ R[p∗] + ε (4)
and
max{C[p] : p = (x, y) ∈ Sn × Sm, x = x∗} ≤ C[p∗] + ε. (5)
When the payoff matrices sum to zero, i.e. R = −C, von Neumann minimax is equivalent to the
Nash equilibrium. Subsequently, von Neumann’s Minimax Theorem was shown to be equivalent to linear
programming, hence solvable in polynomial time due to Khachiyan’s work [11]. On the other hand computing
the Nash equilibrium remains to be a challenging problem after decades of research.
Nash equilibrium can be generalized to more than two players. Denoting R and C by A1 and A2, n,m
as n1, n2 and x, y as p
1, p2, we can describe the problem in more generality where there are any number
n ≥ 2 players and each player i is endowed with his/her own multidimensional payoff matrix Ai, having a
dimension ni for each player. Each player is allowed to select a probability vector p
i ∈ Sni and the collection
of these vectors defines a composite vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) that gives the payoff value for the player as
the evaluation of the multidimensional matrix at p, denoted by Ai[p]. The more general version of Nash
equilibrium assures the existence of p∗ = (p1∗, . . . , p
n
∗ ) so that there is equilibrium for each player, i.e. the
maximum value of Ai[p] when p
i is allowed to range in its respective probability domain while for any other
player j 6= i, pj = pj∗, coincides with Ai[p∗].
In a previous work Kalantari [10] has described a multilinear minimax relaxation, which we abbreviate as
MMR, for Nash equilibrium with two or more players that provides an approximation to a convex combination
of expected payoffs of a Nash Equilibrium. This relaxation has two advantages: (1) it is computable in
polynomial time as it also formulated as a linear programming; (2) it provides an upper bound to a weighted
sum of optimal player payoffs; (3) it gives a strategy (or profile) where at least one player’s payoff is as
good as his respective payoff in any Nash equilibrium. We call such profile 1-player-optimal. This relaxation
provides a link between Nash equilibrium and Minimax, going from Nash equilibrium to a minimax problem,
albeit multilinear and a relaxation as opposed to exact computation.
In this paper, we study this Multilinear Minimax Relaxation for the bimatrix case, solving its correspond-
ing LP formulation and comparing its solution to Nash equilibria generated by state-of-the-art algorithms
for computing Nash equilibria, such as the Lemke-Howsen algorithm, which is known to have worst-case
exponential complexity [16]. Our results are promising both in theoretical and computational sense. On the
one hand, while Lemke-Howson algorithm does not seem to be able to provide answers even in the case of
200 actions, the multilinear minimax relaxation provides good solution even for bimatrix games with 1000
actions. Furthermore, in about 80% of the cases, where Lemke-Howson can compute the Nash equilibrium,
the quality of the solution is better than any Nash equilibria for both players. In the remaining cases while
2
one player’s payoff is better than any Nash Equilibrium payoff, the other player’s payoff is only within a
relative error of 17%. We also show that there is a convex scaling of the payoff matrices R and C by positive
scalars d1 and d2 summing to one such that in the MMR, d1R and d2C have equal payoffs while it is known
that at least one of them does better than any Nash equilibria, albeit we don’t know which player.
The logical validity of MMR is strengthened by the tremendous research on computational complexity and
efficiency of Nash equilbrium reviewed next. A major concept related to the complexity of the computation
of Nash equilibria was introduced by Papadimitriou [15]: a new complexity class for computation of Nash
equilibria called PPAD (Polynomial Parity Argument in Directed Graphs). As described in Daskalakis,
Goldberg, and Papadimitriou [6], PPAD is the complexity class of all search problems that can be reduced
to the END OF THE LINE problem. The END OF THE LINE problem is a search problem where the
input is a directed graph of n vertices that is the union of cycles and paths with 2n vertices. Each vertex is
represented by an n-bit string of 0 and 1, and the edges of a vertex v are described by two boolean circuits
of polynomial size in n, P and S, each with n input bits and n output bits, giving the predecessor and the
successor vertices of v. An unbalanced vertex is a vertex with an incoming edge but no outgoing edges, or an
outgoing edge but no incoming edges. Given an unbalanced vertex v, END OF THE LINE outputs the other
end of the path. Thus, a problem is PPAD-complete if the END OF THE LINE problem is polynomially
reducible to it. PPAD is a subset of NP. Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou [6] showed that the
computation of Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete for games with 4 or more players. Later, they showed
that the computation of Nash equilibria for 3-player games is PPAD-complete [6]. Lastly, Chen and Deng [2]
showed that the computation of Nash equilibria for bimatrix games, i.e. 2-player games, is PPAD-complete.
On the other hand, it is well known that Nash equilibria is Pareto-inefficient. Dubey [5] has shown that the
Nash equilibria of games with smooth payoff functions are generally Pareto-inefficient. Pareto efficiency is
the state of a system where it is impossible for any player to change their strategy to increase their payoffs
without making another player worse off.
In addition to the computational complexity of Nash equilibria, algorithms for its computation for bima-
trix case have also been studied, such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm [12] and subsequently by von Stengel
[17], who showed that the algorithm has a worst-case exponential time complexity. The pivotal assumption
for Lemke-Howson is that the game must be non-degenerate, i.e. if the number of pure best responses to a
mixed strategy does not exceed the number of pure strategies with a positive probability, see [17]. However,
small perturbations can turn a game into non-degenerate. The Lemke-Howson algorithm uses the idea that
a mixed strategy can be labelled by an index respective to the player’s pure best strategy and subsequent
best responses. The Tableau Method for the Lemke-Howson algorithm is a way to turn the geometric inter-
pretation of the Nash equilibria as endpoints of a path into a solution of a linear program. In this case, the
disjoint paths and cycles are interpreted as vertices and edges of a polyhedron. Then, traversing a polyhe-
dron’s vertices amounts to pivoting. Using Linear Complementarity, the solution of these Nash equilibria
can be found, see [17]. The algorithm can find every Nash equilibria of the game. Lemke-Howson algorithm
runs in worst-case exponential time in the number of pure strategies to find even one Nash equilibrium for
both players because of pivoting and traversing the polyhedron’s vertices, see [16]. Therefore, Lemke-Howson
algorithm is not viable for games where each player might have a large number of actions.
In summary, the computation of Nash Equilibria, even in bimatrix games, is intractable. In addition,
it is known that Nash equilibria is Pareto-inefficient. Therefore, it is good to find efficiently computable
relaxations that are reasonably sound. There are polynomial-time approximation algorithms for computing
Nash equilibria available in the literature, in particular by Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou [7] which
gives an approximation guarantee of 0.38197. The approximation algorithm of Bosse, Byrka, Markakis [1]
achieves a slightly better approximation guarantee of 0.36392. However, while their algorithm relies on
computing modified games that are zero-sum, MMR works with the original payoff matrices. While, in
this article, we do not have such theoretical bounds for MMR, we give experimental results which are very
promising, both in performance and complexity of computation.
The organization of the remaining sections of the article is as follows: In Section 2, we give the formulation
of the multilinear minimax relaxation for Nash Equilibria and its game theoretic interpretation. In Section 3,
we give an algorithm for computations of MMR, along with two examples: one illustrating the Nash equilibria
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computed by Lemke-Howson and MMR algorithm, and the other illustrating that by MMR algorithm, at
least one player has a better payoff than any payoff given by the Nash equilibrium. In Section 4, we provide
experimental results comparing MMR to the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Lastly, in Section 5, we give a
theorem stating that for any bimatrix game, there exists a convex scaling that gives balanced payoffs to
both players Row and Column. We also provide figures that illustrate, for games with different number of
actions, how MMR payoffs change for various scalings.
2 The Multilinear Minimax Relaxation of Nash Equilibria
The Multilinear Minimax Relaxation (MMR) for Nash equilibria was introduced in [10], and a formulation
of a multilinear minimax theorem was stated and proven (Theorem 2 in [10]). Here we describe it for the
bimatrix game.
Consider the n×m matrices R = (Rij) and C = (Cij). For a positive integer k let
Sk = {u ∈ Rk :
n∑
j=1
uj = 1, u ≥ 0}. (6)
Set ∆ = Sn × Sm. Given α = (α1, α2) ∈ S2 and p = (x, y) ∈ ∆, consider the trilinear form
A0[α, p] = α1R[p] + α2C[p], (7)
where
R[p] = xTRy, C[p] = xTCy. (8)
We will refer to A0[α, p] as weighted-sum payoff or expected payoff.
Theorem 1. (Multilinear Minimax Relaxation for Bimatrix Games [10])
min
α∈S2
max
p∈∆
A0[α, p] = max
p∈∆
min
x∈S2
A0[x, p]. (9)
Let α∗ and p∗ = (x∗, y∗) be the solution computed for the minimax formulation. Then, for any (α, p) ∈ S2×∆
we have
A0[α
∗, p] ≤ A0[α∗, p∗] ≤ A0[α, p∗] (10)
Furthermore, (α∗, p∗) is computable via a primal-dual pair of linear programming with O(n×m) variables.
It is important to note that in zero-sum games, i.e. games where the sum of the profits of both players
equal to 0, the strategy given by the minimax solution is the same as the Nash equilibrium. However, this
property is not generally true for all games. Thus, the minimax formulation given above serves only as an
approximation.
2.1 A Game Theoretic Interpretation of MMR
Here we give a game theoretic interpretation of the Multilinear Minimax Relaxation. In order to describe the
game and the minimax approximation it is more convenient to give a uniform notation. So we will explain
the game theoretic interpretation using this more convenient notation. The game takes place between three
players, P1 = Row, P2 = Column, as well as a meta-player M . Players P1 and P2 are given two n1 × n2
payoff matrices, written for notational convenience as
A1 = (a1,I), A2 = (a2,I),
where
I = (i1, i2) ∈ N = N1 ×N2, N1 = {1, . . . , n1}, N2 = {1, . . . , n2}.
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The game is played by the players simultaneously choosing an action:
M chooses an action i ∈ T = {1, 2}.
P1 chooses an action i1 ∈ N1.
P2 chooses an action i2 ∈ N2.
The actions are revealed simultaneously. Once i ∈ T and I = (i1, i2) ∈ N = N1 ×N2 are revealed, M loses
ai,I dollars to player i. Thus player i wins ai,I dollars. The other player does not win or lose. The number
ai,I can be assumed to be positive or negative. Thus winning could actually be losing.
2.2 Strategies Under Pure Actions
Strategy for M : For each player Pi, i ∈ N that M selects, the worst amount M could lose is max{a(i, I) :
I ∈ N̂}. Thus M choose a player that minimizes this loss, i.e. M computes i from the following optimization:
min
i∈T
max
I∈N
{ai,I}. (11)
Strategy for players P1 and P2: For each I = (i1, i2) ∈ N formed by their individual selection of i1, i2,
M will lose at least min{ai,I : i ∈ T} dollars. So the best action pair I is the one that maximizes this loss,
i.e. the players P1 and P2 compute their probability vector I by solving:
max
I∈N
min
i∈T
{ai,I}. (12)
As in the case zero-sum game the two quantities may be different.
2.3 Strategies Under Randomized Actions
Suppose that M and the players P1, P2 choose their actions randomly:
M chooses a player with probability vector α ∈ S2.
P1 chooses an action with probability vector p
1 ∈ Sn1 .
P2 chooses an action with probability vector p
2 ∈ Sn2 .
Set p = (p1, p2). Let ∆ = Sn1 × Sn2 . For each I = (i1, i2) ∈ N , let p(I) = p1i1p2i2 . The expected payoff
for each player Pi, i = 1, 2 is:
Ai[p] =
∑
I∈N
ai,Ip(I) = (p
1)TAip
2. (13)
Strategy for M : For each α ∈ S2 he selects, the worst expected loss is the maximum of the weighted
payoff
A0[α, p] = α1A1[p] + α2A2[p], (14)
as p ranges in ∆. Thus he choose the players according to the probability vector α that minimizes this loss,
i.e.
min
α∈S2
max
p∈∆
A0[α, p]. (15)
Strategy for P1 and P2: For each p ∈ ∆ they select, the minimum expected loss for M is the minimum
of α1A1[p] + α2A2[p] as x ranges in S2. Thus the best I ∈ N is the one that maximizes this, i.e.
max
p∈∆
min
α∈S2
A0[α, p]. (16)
According to Theorem 1 the two quantities (15) and (16) are equal.
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3 Applications to Approximation of Nash Equilibrium
Suppose p∗ = (p1∗, p
2
∗) ∈ Sn1 × Sn2 is a Nash Equilibrium corresponding to payoff matrices A1 and A2, i.e.
max
p1∈Sn1
A1[p
1, p2∗] = A1[p
1
∗, p
2
∗] = A1[p∗], max
p2∈Sn2
A2[p
1
∗, p
2] = A2[p
1
∗, p
2
∗] = A2[p∗]. (17)
By substituting p∗ for p in Theorem 1, we get:
Theorem 2. Let p∗ be a Nash equilibrium and p∗ a solution to the Multilinear Minimax Relaxation. Then
α∗1A1[p∗] + α
∗
2A2[p∗] ≤ α∗1A1[p∗] + α∗2A2[p∗]. (18)
In other words we can approximate a weighted average of Ai[p∗] in Nash equilibrium via an optimal
minimax value. As a corollary we get,
Corollary 1. Either A1[p∗] ≤ A1[p∗], or A2[p∗] ≤ A2[p∗]. In particular, if both inequalities are satisfied,
then p∗ gives a better payoff than p∗ for both players.
Remark 1. According to Corollary 1, by solving the Multilinear Minimax Relaxation we are guaranteed
that at least one player has a payoff that is no worse than any Nash equilibrium payoff.
Remark 2. Theorem 1 is valid for any number of players and the corresponding p∗ can be computed in
polynomial-time, in contrast to the computation for Nash equilibria, which even in the bimatrix games is
PPAD-complete [2]. Thus, MMR may particularly work well in the bimatrix case because the computational
complexity is O(n×m), where n and m are the number of actions for the players.
3.1 Algorithmic Computation of Multilinear Minimax Relaxation
A very important algorithmic aspect of the Multilinear Minimax Relaxation is that it can be solved via
linear programming. Following the general formulation in [10] of the LP and dual LP for MMR, it can be
shown that for the bimatrix case these are defined as follows:
min δ
(LP ) Rijα1 + Cijα2 ≤ δ, ∀i ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1,m],
α1 + α2 = 1,
α1 ≥ 0,
α2 ≥ 0.
maxλ
(DLP )
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Rijqij ≥ λ,
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Cijqij ≥ λ,
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
qij = 1,
qij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1,m].
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Let Q be the n×m matrix (qij). Given a positive integer k let ek = (1, . . . , 1)T ∈ Rk. Then set
x∗ = Qem y∗ = QT en.
In other words x∗ is the vector of row sums of Q and y∗ is the vector of column sums. Then x∗ is the strategy
for the Row player, and y∗ is the strategy for the Column player. From this, (3) and (4) follows.
Remark 3. In theory, x∗ and y∗ should be vectors that sum to 1. However, in practice, due to round-off
errors, x∗ and y∗ may need to be normalized.
Remark 4. To find the solution to the (LP), we can first find the solution to the (DLP) and get λ∗. Then,
since we know that δ∗ = λ∗, we can show that at least one of the inequalities of the (LP) must be tight.
Together with the fact that α1 + α2 = 1, we can solve the following system of equations:
α1Rij + α2Cij = δ
∗,
α1 + α2 = 1,
for some pair i, j. Once we have a solution pair (α1, α2), provided that the system of equations is consistent,
we check the solution satisfies the other inequalities in the (LP). If it does, then the solution pair is the
solution to (LP).
3.2 Example of Nash Equilibria and Solution of MMR
We now provide an example to illustrate how Lemke-Howson and MMR algorithm works Suppose the game
has the following payoff matrices for Row player and Column player,
R =
[
5 3
3 4
]
, C =
[
3 2
2 1
]
Using Lemke-Howson algorithm via the Tableau Method, one derives the following Nash equilibrium p∗ =
(x∗, y∗) for players Row and Column:
x∗ = (1, 0), y∗ = (1, 0)
Therefore, the payoffs for Row player and Column player are:
xT∗Ry∗ = 5, x
T
∗ Cy∗ = 3
On the other hand, by using Multilinear Minimax Relaxation, one has the following dual linear program:
max λ
s.t. 5q11 + 3q12 + 3q21 + 4q22 − λ ≥ 0
3q11 + 2q12 + 2q21 + q22 − λ ≥ 0
q11 + q12 + q21 + q22 = 1
q11, q12, q21, q22 ≥ 0
The dual LP admits the following solution:
q11 = 1, q12 = 0
q21 = 0, q22 = 0
Let Q be the 2× 2 matrix (qij). Then,
x∗ = Qe2 = (q11 + q12, q21 + q22) = (1, 0)
and
y∗ = QT e2 = (q11 + q21, q12 + q22) = (1, 0)
This is the same pair of strategies as the one found using Lemke-Howson, so the MMR payoffs are the same
as the Nash equilibrium payoffs.
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3.3 Example Illustrating the Dominance of Solutions of MMR
We now illustrate Corollary 1, which guarantees that at least one player has a payoff no worse than any
Nash equilibrium. Suppose the following bimatrix game is played, where Row player and Column player
have the following payoff matrices:
R =
0.388 0.600 0.7610.059 0.149 0.806
0.633 0.850 0.031
 , C =
 1.0 0.132 0.4960.513 0.084 0.946
0.0 0.904 0.905

Using Lemke-Howson algorithm via the Tableau Method, there are three mixed strategy Nash equilibria
p1∗ = (x
1
∗, y
1
∗), p
2
∗ = (x
2
∗, y
2
∗), p
3
∗ = (x
3
∗, y
3
∗) for this game.
x1∗ = (0.643, 0.0, 0.357), y
1
∗ = (0.749, 0.0, 0.250)
which gives a payoff of 0.482 for Row player and 0.642 for Column player.
x2∗ = (0.462, 0.538, 0.0), y
2
∗ = (0.120, 0.0, 0.879)
which gives a payoff of 0.716 for Row player and 0.738 for Column player.
x3∗ = (0.0, 1.0, 0.0), y
3
∗ = (0.0, 0.0, 1.0)
which gives a payoff of 0.806 for Row player and 0.946 for Column player.
On the other hand, by using multilinear minimax, one has the following dual linear program:
max λ
s.t. 0.388q11 + 0.600q12 + · · · + 0.031q33 − λ ≥ 0
1.0q11 + 0.132q12 + · · · + 0.905q33 − λ ≥ 0
q11 + q12 + · · · + q33 = 1
q11, q12, · · · , q33 ≥ 0
This gives an approximate Nash equilibrium p∗ = (x∗, y∗), where
x∗ = (0, 0, 1), y∗ = (0, 1, 0)
This relaxation gives a payoff of 0.850 for the Row player and 0.904 for the Column player. The payoffs
of the three true Nash equilibria for Row player are 0.482, 0.716, and 0.806. thus Row player has a payoff
found by MMR algorithm better than any payoffs from the three Nash equilibria,
4 Experimental Results
Here we describe our computational results, comparing MMR and the Lemke-Howson algorithms. For Lemke-
Howson algorithm, we used the function lcp solve from Gambit 15.1.1 to compute the Nash equilibria. For
MMR algorithm, we used the python library CVXOPT, which uses the glpx library to solve the corresponding
LP-problems. Programs run for a maximum time of 30 minutes before they are terminated and returned an
error. This choice is appropriate since MMR algorithm can run games with number of actions up to 2000
in 30 minutes. For each comparison, we ran the algorithms 1000 times, which is a suitable number of data
points.
4.1 Comparison of Lemke-Howson and Multilinear Minimax Relaxation
First, we compared the speed of both algorithms, with the number of actions for games ranging up to 2000,
and time ranging up to 30 minutes (1800 seconds). For games with number of actions around 150 and more,
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sometimes Lemke-Howson terminated early. In about 35.8% of the games with 150 actions, Lemke-Howson
terminated early and did not give a Nash equilbrium. That percentage increased as the number of actions
increases. In fact, for games with number of actions greater than or equal to 500, Lemke-Howson never
terminated with a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, MMR still gave a solution even for actions up to
2000. For number of actions around 150 and greater, MMR outperformed Lemke-Howson. In summary, this
makes MMR a tractable algorithm for computing relaxations of Nash equilibria for games with large number
of actions. Figure 1 captures only some of the results.
0 100 200 500 1,000
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100
200
500
1,000
1,500
1,800
Algorithm terminates early
Number of actions
T
im
es
(i
n
se
co
n
d
s)
L-H
MMR
Figure 1: Speed comparisons for Lemke-Howson and MMR algorithms
Next, Figure 2 shows the percentage of times the MMR algorithm had better payoffs for both players than
the payoffs of the corresponding Nash equilibria found by Lemke-Howson algorithm. In this case, actions
only go up to 150 since any actions greater than 200 results in Lemke-Howson algorithm terminating early.
Actions Percentages
10 81.2%
30 80.3%
60 79.98%
100 82.0055%
150 80.023%
Figure 2: Percentages of times MMR algorithm had better payoffs for both players
In the remaining cases, that means one of the players had a worse MMR payoff than the Nash equilibrium
payoff. Figure 3 shows the relative error between the payoff of the worse-off player’s solution of MMR
algorithm to its corresponding Nash equilibrium payoff found by Lemke-Howson algorithm. Suppose the
MMR solution was p∗ = (x∗, y∗) and the Nash equilibrium was p∗ = (x∗, y∗). If Row had a worse MMR
payoff, the relative error would be:
xT∗Ry∗ − (x∗)TRy∗
xT∗Ry∗
As shown by the experimental results, MMR algorithm outperforms Lemke-Howson both in time com-
plexity and the quality of payoffs.
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Actions Relative errors
10 0.129 ± .020
30 0.090 ± .012
60 0.110 ± .010
100 0.151 ± .016
150 0.141 ± .004
Figure 3: Relative errors of payoffs if one player’s MMR payoff did worse than the Nash equilibrium payoff
5 Convex Scaling of Payoff Matrices
There is additional gain in computing the MMR solution. In the bimatrix case, let d = (d1, d2) ∈ S2 be the
convex scaling for matrices R = (Rij) and C = (Cij), where S2 = {u ∈ R2 : u1 + u2 = 1, u1, u2 ≥ 0}, i.e.
replace R by d1R and C by d2C. The corresponding Nash Equilibrium for the scaled matrices will remain
unchanged. However, the corresponding optimal MMR solution, denoted by (α∗(d), p∗(d)), may change,
giving a new inequality from Theorem 2:
d1α
∗
1(d)R[p∗] + d2α
∗
2(d)C[p∗] ≤ d1α∗1(d)R[p∗(d)] + d2α∗2C[p∗(d)]. (19)
One may ask: Is there a d for which the Nash equilbrium p∗ = p∗(d), and if so, is there an algorithm
to compute the minimax approximation to obtain p∗ for the bimatrix case? Of course, such an algorithm
stemming from PPAD-complete results may not be tractable. This If d ∈ S◦2 , the interior of S2, then
d′ = (d′1, d
′
2) where d
′
i = dixi(d)/(d1x1(d) + d2x2(d)), gives a new point in S
◦
2 , giving rise to a new scaling.
Convex scaling for the multilinear matrix was considered in [10]. In this paper, we take another route, and
ask the question: Is there is a convex scaling for which the corresponding payoffs are equal? An advantage
to such a scaling is that it’s a satisfactory compromise to both players since, aside from equality of payoffs,
MMR guarantees one player’s payoff is always as good as any Nash equilibrium payoff. Note that the LP
formulation of the convex scaling pair of matrices is the following:
min δ
(SLP ) α1d1Rij + α2d2Cij ≤ δ, ∀i ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1,m],
α1 + α2 = 1,
α1 ≥ 0,
α2 ≥ 0.
maxλ
(SDLP )
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Rijqij ≥ λ/d1,
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Cijqij ≥ λ/d2,
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
qij = 1,
qij ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1,m].
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5.1 Existence of a Convex Scaling Pair with Balanced MMR Payoffs
Here, we show that there will always exist a convex scaling pair d = (d1, d2) ∈ S2 so that the MMR payoffs
for Row player and Column player will be equal. First, we give a definition.
Definition 1. A profile is called 1-player-optimal if at least one player’s expected payoff is greater than the
expected payoffs of any Nash equilibria. A profile is called balanced if both expected payoffs are equal.
According to this definition, we know that the MMR solution is 1-player-optimal. In addition, we show
that there is a convex scaling so that the corresponding MMR solution is also balanced. In fact, as our
experimental results show, there are many such MMR solutions that are balanced.
Theorem 3. Let R, C ∈ [0, 1]n×n be the payoff matrices for Row player and Column player, respectively.
Assume R and C are not both identically zero. For each t ∈ [0, 1] let p∗(t) = (p1∗(t), p2∗(t)) be the MMR
solution corresponding to the case when R is replaced by tR and C by (1− t)C. Then there exists t∗ ∈ [0, 1]
such that,
t∗R[p∗(t∗)] = (1− t∗)C[p∗(t∗)], (20)
hence, a balanced scaling.
Proof. We prove the theorem by showing two results:
(1) If in a linear programming the constraint coefficient for one variable is changed continuously as a
function of a single variable, the optimal objective value changes continuously.
(2) A continuous function from [0, 1] into itself has a fixed point.
The proof of (2) is well known. Now scaling R by tR, t ∈ (0, 1), changes the corresponding DLP (see SLP
and SDLP), replacing λ in the constraint matrix by λ/t. The foregoing argument applies to the DLP. By
converting the LP into one in the standard form it is not difficult to prove that the optimal objective value
changes continuously for t in this range. More specifically, consider continuously changing the coefficient of
one of the variables, say xr, as a function of t in the standard LP min{cTx : Ax = b, x ≥ 0} where A is an
m × n matrix of rank m. Using the standard LP notation, suppose B is an optimal m ×m basis matrix.
Then decomposing A and c in the standard LP fashion and denoting the j-th column of A by aj , the optimal
objective value is cBB
−1b. Now if the variable xr is in the basis, and if ar changes continuously as a function
of t, then by Cramer’s rule, B−1 changes continuously, and since zj = cBB−1aj changes continuously, so
does the objective value. If xr is not in the basis, zr = cBB
−1ar changes continuously as a function of t.
In particular, if zr − cr < 0, it remains less than zero for small changes in t. If zr − cr = 0 then there is
alternate optimal solution so that we can bring zr into the basis and argue as in the previous case. Thus we
have proved (1). On the other hand, since R and C were assumed not to be identically 0, for t = 0 or t = 1,
the corresponding optimal values are positive for one player and zero for the other player at each endpoint of
the interval. Now consider the function f(t) = tR[p∗(t)]− (1− t)C[p∗(t)]. By (1) it is a continuous function
of t. On the other hand f(0) < 0 while f(1) > 0. Thus there exists t∗ where f(t∗) = 0, (by the standard
proof of (2)).
5.2 Computations of Convex Scaling for Balanced MMR Payoffs
To compute a convex scaling such that the corresponding strategies gives balanced MMR payoffs, we consider
the following method: let α0 = 0, where the payoff for Row is less than the payoff for Column and let α1 = 1,
where the payoff for Row is greater than the payoff for Column. By continuity, there must exist an α2 so
that α0 < α2 < α1 and the payoff for Row is equal to the payoff for Column. This α2 can be searched
using the Bisection Method, where for each iteration, set α2 = (α0 +α1)/2, and if the payoff for Row is less
than the payoff for Column at α2, then set α0 = α2. Otherwise, set α1 = α2 and continue. In fact, there is
usually more than one such balanced convex scaling. In Figure 4, we provide different graphs showing MMR
payoffs for Row and Column players when using different scalings in [0, 1], illustrating this point, along with
a vertical line at d1 = .5 to show the comparison of unscaled expected payoffs between Row and Column.
Choosing the best possible balanced convex scaling is, ideally, the most preferable scaling.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 4: (a), (b), (c), and (d) show the plots of expected payoffs for Row and Column for various scalings
in [0, 1] for games with number of actions equal to 30; (e) and (f) show the plots of expected payoffs for Row
and Column for various scalings in [0, 1] for games with number of actions equal to 150. Scaling values are
for Row player. The scaling value for Column player would be one minus the scaling value for Row player.
The figures include a vertical line at .5 to indicate where the original unscaled expected payoffs for Row and
Column are.
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6 Concluding Remarks and Future Work
In this paper, we considered the bimatrix case of multilinear minimax relaxation (MMR), decribed in [10],
which is a generalization of von Neumann’s Minimax, and showed it gave better strategy profiles than the
Nash equilibrium most of the time. We have computationally solved the corresponding primal-dual problems
for square matrices with values between 0 and 1 with actions up to 2000, along with computations of the
actual Nash equilibria via Lemke-Howson, whenever it terminated and gave a solution. In 80% of the
games ran, MMR outperformed Lemke-Howson for the payoffs of both players. We conclude that based on
these computations, MMR is a worthy algorithm for bimatrix games, and in these cases, ε-approximation is
not sufficiently relevant. Because we used existing software to solve the LP’s for MMR, a question arises:
Can we find more efficient and specially-designed algorithms for LP’s with games with a large number of
actions? The multilinear minimax relaxation for more than two players is a future prospect that should be
investigated. There are also state-of-the-art algorithms for computing Nash equilibria for n-player games, like
the Govindan-Wilson algorithm [9]. Comparing the multilinear minimax relaxation with this such algorithms
is also a subject for further study.
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